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ENTERPRISE ZONES IN THE COURTS: LEGAL CHAL-
LENGES TO STATE ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT LEGIS-
LATION
I. INTODUCTION
The declining state of our nation's cities has been, and con-
tinues to be, a frequent source of news' and fodder for political
debate.2 Unemployment, urban blight, crime, and economic
dislocation are just a few of the inner-city's afflictions which
occupy the American mind.' A multitude of theories have been
advanced in order to explain the persistence of urban deteriora-
tion,4 accompanied by an array of governmental attempts to
reverse, or at least stem, the trend of inner-city decay.5
In the early 1980s, the concept of Enterprise Zones (EZs)
came to the fore in American urban revitalization programs.'
EZs are legislatively designated, economically depressed areas,
within which tax, monetary, and regulatory benefits are offered
to businesses planning to remain, establish, or relocate.' The
federal government has only recently embraced the EZ concept
after years of reluctance and trepidation, and new federal EZ
legislation continues to make its way through Congress.8
1. E.g., Mark Bowes, Counties May Not Stave Off Urban Ills, RICH. TIMEs-DIs-
PATCH, Jan. 2, 1996, at A3.
2. See, e.g., Mark Johnson, House Retains Tougher Crack Law: Backers Reject
Cries of Racism, RICH. TIIES-DISPATCH, Oct. 19, 1995, at All.
3. Michael A. Stegman, National Urban Policy Revisited, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1737,
1758-59 (1993); see Bill Geroux, Inner City Problems Spread, Leaders Told, RICH.
TIMEs-DISPATCH, June 16, 1995, at B4.
4. See generally E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, The Prospects for
'Putting America to Work" in the Inner City, 81 GEO. L.J. 2003 (1993).
5. See generally id.
6. For a "genealogy" of EZs in America, see Michael Allan Wolf, Potential Legal
Pitfalls Facing State and Local Enterprise Zones, 8 URB. L. & POLY 77, 77-81 (1986).
7. Laura A. Nicolette, The Enterprise Community Development Act of 1993-H.R.
15, Urban Enterprise Zones: Do or Die Legislation for Our Nation's Cities, 17 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 603, 603 (1993).
8. In his article U.S. Urban Areas Seek New Paths to Prosperity, FORUM FOR AP-
PLIED RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY, Winter 1996, at 84, Professor Michael Allan
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In inapposition to the federal government's hesitation, over
the past fifteen years a number of municipalities and almost
forty states have enacted legislation designating EZs. Naturally,
each state has taken an individual approach to the establish-
ment of its EZs, structuring its incentive and funding packages
in various ways.' The differing state programs have spawned a
substantial debate over policy considerations, most notably in
Colorado, where a controversy currently rages over the propri-
ety of the very existence of EZs.' °
Despite the ongoing dialogue concerning underlying EZ policy,
little mention has been made of the legal aspects of EZ legisla-
tion." EZs are fertile sources for litigation, due to the fact
that they often involve legislative classifications, eminent do-
main, and preferential tax, hiring, and deregulatory schemes.'
As more states and municipalities continue to create EZs, and
as the federal EZ programs take shape and gain momentum,
legal challenges to EZ systems are likely to continue. Further-
more, persons wishing to challenge or shape EZ policy on either
the state or federal level will benefit from having the legal
principles surrounding EZs in their repertoires. The purpose of
this comment is to provide a survey of Enterprise Zone legisla-
tive schemes as they have fared in the courts, highlighting the
various legal trends that have developed with EZs over the past
fifteen years.
Wolf tracks the federal EZ project, offering strategies for the effective implementation
of such economic revitalization programs. For an accounting of legal, legislative, and
administrative developments affecting state and federal EZs, see EZ GAZErE,
http://www.urich.edu/-ezproj; see also EMPOWERMENT ZONES AND ENTERPRISE COMmU-
NITIES INTERNET HOME PAGE, http:J/www.ezec.gov (providing an informational resource
for federal EZs and Enterprise Communities).
9. Jeffrey M. Euston, Clinton's Empowerment Zones: Hope for the Cities or a
Failing Enterprise?, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 140, 141-42 (1994).
10. Ann Imse, Rail Deal Cost Colorado up to $ 21.4 million: Southern Pacific Re-
ceived Incentives that Benefited State's Richest Man for Jobs Scheduled to be Cut,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 14, 1996, at 4A.
11. For a full analysis of the legal underpinnings and jurisprudential aspects of
EZs, see Michael Allan Wolf, Enterprise Zones Through the Legal Looking Glass, in
ENTERPRISE ZONES 58 (Roy A. Green ed., 1991).
12. See Wolf, supra note 6, for a detailed account of the legal ramifications of,
and possible difficulties that can arise in, the implementation of EZ urban and rural
renewal programs.
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II. THE CREATION OF EZs
A. The Legislative Process
Many legal issues surrounding EZs arise at their very incep-
tion, with questions arising as to the constitutionality of the EZ
scheme, and as to whom should control EZ operations. The
establishment of EZs in Colorado, for example, has been a rath-
er tumultuous process from the outset. In Romer v. Colorado
General Assembly, 3 Roy Romer, in his capacity as Governor of
Colorado, brought a declaratory judgment action against the
General Assembly seeking a determination that his vetoes of
certain bills, including the Enterprise Zone Expansion bill,'4
were valid. Governor Romer had sent the bills back to the leg-
islature with the words "disapproved and vetoed" on them, and
nothing more.'
The court held that the Governor's bald rejection of the bills
was insufficient to constitute a valid veto, and that the
Governor's specific reasons for rejecting the bills were necessary
to avoid violating the Colorado Constitution. 6
In re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Roy Romer on
House Bill 91S-1005' also involved the propriety of the desig-
nation of a Colorado EZ system. In this case, Governor Romer
inquired into the constitutionality of certain bills that were to
fund incentive packages designed to attract a United Airlines
Maintenance Facility to Denver. The bills in question (1) estab-
lished the Colorado Business Incentive Fund, (2) authorized the
state to enter into "intergovernmental agreements" with local
governments (such agreements would provide incentives to
private entities to establish new business facilities in special
EZs), and (3) established an "aviation fund" consisting of cer-
tain revenues derived from the state's excise, sales, and avia-
tion use taxes. 8
13. 840 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1992).
14. S.B. 131, 58th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1991).
15. 840 P.2d at 1082.
16. Id. at 1083.
17. 814 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1991).
18. Id. at 878.
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At issue were several provisions of the Colorado Constitution
concerning the relationship between the Colorado government
and business. In affirming the constitutionality of the bills, the
court came to the following conclusions. First, the bills did not
provide unconstitutional, impermissible aid to a corporation.
The bills passed muster in part due to a public purpose excep-
tion to this prohibition, which was met since the bills were de-
signed to stimulate employment, economic development, and
new business creation." Moreover, the bills on their face made
no aid to any corporation or company.2' Second, the bills did
not run afoul of the Anti-Appropriation Clause of the Colorado
Constitution, which prohibits appropriations to any entity "not
under the absolute control of the state" since the monies went
to governments, not private entities.22 Third, the bills did not
contain any prohibited "irrevocable grant of special privileges,
franchises or immunities."" Fourth, the bills did not constitute
prohibited "special legislation" since (1) the class of entities
which were to benefit from the legislation was a genuine class,
(2) the classification of entities based on the number of employ-
ees to be hired was reasonable, and (3) there was a reasonable
relationship between the classifications and the stated purpose
of economic redevelopment.24 Finally, the funding provided by
the bills did not violate the constitutional prohibition against
state debt, since the bills contained no provisions that either
pledged future state revenues, or imposed obligations that
would require future revenues from tax otherwise available for
general purposes.25
19. Id. at 883 (construing COLO. CONST. art. XI, § 2).
20. Id. at 883-84.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 883 (construing COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34).
23. Id. at 885.
24. Id. at 887-88. Although the court did not find the statutes in question to be
"special legislation" designed to benefit United Airlines alone, in Beer v. Continental
Airlines (In re Continental Airlines), 149 B.R. 76 (D. Del. 1993), the court disallowed
EZ benefits for Continental's activities in the Denver EZ, holding that the legislative
history behind the creation of the Denver special EZ indicated that this legislation
was specifically "enacted to address [a] single structure contemplated by [a] proposed
United Airlines Maintenance Facility. . . ." 149 B.R. at 88. For a complete discussion
of Beer, see infra part III.A.
25. 814 P.2d at 889 (construing Gohnson v. McDonald, 49 P.2d 1017, 1025 (Colo.
1935)).
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The Colorado experience provides insight into the tension
between government efforts to stimulate lagging economies
through direct financial incentives and various constitutional
prohibitions against immediate alliances between government
and private business entities. As more communities seek EZ
status for the purposes of attracting new businesses, and as
public outcry increases over "corporate welfare," policy makers
should be aware that legislation designed to attract and fund
one particular business venture may be viewed less favorably
by the courts than in previous years.26
In addition to issues surrounding the passage of EZ legisla-
tion, tensions can develop over who should exercise control over
EZs once they are designated. Kentucky ran into difficulties
operating its EZ system when a power struggle broke out be-
tween the Kentucky General Assembly and Governor John Y.
Brown, Jr. At issue in Legislative Research Commission v.
Brown"7 was a group of statutes which allowed the Legislative
Research Commission (LRC) (an "arm" of the General Assem-
bly), and certain members of the General Assembly, to make
appointments to various administrative agencies.28 The Ken-
tucky Enterprise Zone Authority was one such agency.' The
Governor asserted that such legislation constituted a violation
of the separation of powers doctrine, and the LRC countered by
seeking a declaration of rights to confirm its power."0 The trial
court found the various statutes to be unconstitutional, and the
LRC appealed."'
The LRC is comprised of the President Pro Tem of the Sen-
ate, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and minority
floor leaders of the Senate and the House. 2 Its role has his-
torically been that of a "research, fact-finding, secretariat, and
general support agency for the General Assembly.""3 In 1982,
however, the General Assembly enacted five categories of stat-
26. See infra note 63.
27. 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
28. Id. at 920.
29. Id. at 920 nn.16-17.
30. Id. at 910.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 911.
33. Id.
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utes, effectively expanding the power of the LRC.' The second
and third categories affected the administration of Kentucky's
EZs."5 The second category made the Speaker of the House
and the President Pro Tem ex officio members of the Enterprise
Zone Authority.36 The third category conferred upon the LRC,
or a joint legislative committee, the power to advise and con-
sent to the Governor's appointments to the Enterprise Zone
Authority.
37
In considering the validity of the statutes in question, the
court referred to earlier Kentucky case law dealing with the
appointment of officers to administrative boards and agen-
cies.38 Although the balance of power between the Governor
and the General Assembly has historically been a point of con-
tention in Kentucky, the court determined that "while [the
Constitution] authorizes the Legislature to provide by law for
the appointment or election of such officers, it does not autho-
rize the Legislature itself to make such appointment or elec-
tion."39 The court reinforced its view in noting that "such pow-
er on the part of the Legislature . .. would enable it to grad-
ually absorb into itself the patronage and control of the greater
part of the functioning agencies of the state and county gov-
ernments, and thus endowed it would be little short of a legis-
lative oligarchy."
40
Applying these principles to the challenged statutes, the court
ruled that the second category of statutes, making the Speaker
and the President Pro Tern members of the Enterprise Zone
Authority, constituted a "legislative appointment which in-
fringe[d] [upon] the right of the Governor to make such
appointments."4' The third category of statutes, authorizing
the LRC or an interim legislative committee to advise and con-
sent on appointments to the Enterprise Zone Authority, was
34. Id. at 916.
35. Id. at 920.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 921-23.
39. Id. at 923 (quoting Sibert v. Garret, 246 S.W. 455, 459 (Ky. 1922) (first em-
phasis added)).
40. Id. (quoting Sibert v. Garret, 246 S.W. 455, 460 (Ky. 1922)).
41. Id. at 924.
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also held to be invalid as being violative of the separation of
powers doctrine.'
B. Property Concerns
The process of designating EZs invariably involves land and
real property issues, as land is often classified or appropriated
in order to further EZ goals. In Gay v. City of Springdale,'
the Springdale City Council (City Council) annexed approxi-
mately 7,000 acres of land surrounding the city." The owners
of the four tracts of land in question challenged the city's an-
nexation of the tracts on the ground that the tracts did not
meet the requirements of section 14-40-302(a) of the Arkansas
Code.' According to this statute,
a city may annex lands contiguous to the city if the lands
are either: (1) [p]latted and held for sale or use as munici-
pal lots; (2) [whether platted or not, if the lands are held
to be sold as suburban property; (3) [w]hen the lands fur-
nish the abode for a densely settled community or represent
the actual growth of the municipality beyond its legal
boundary; (4) [wihen the lands are needed for any proper
municipal purposes ... ; or (5) [w]hen they are valuable by
reason of their adaptability for prospective municipal us-
es.
Annexation is proper when any one of these criteria is met.47
The City Council claimed that the annexation of two of the
tracts could be justified under the fourth criterion mentioned
above, since those tracts contained EZs.' The city argued that
until the tracts came within the city limits, the EZs could not
be "activated," and businesses could not take advantage of the
accompanying economic incentives. 49 The court agreed that the
activation of the EZs constituted a proper municipal purpose,
42. Id.
43. 769 S.W.2d 740 (Ark. 1989).
44. Id. at 741.
45. Id. (citing ARK CODE ANN. § 14-40-302(a) (Michie 1987)).
46. Id. at 741-42.
47. Id. at 742.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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and thus held that the annexation of the land in question was
proper under section 14-40-302(a)."
Eminent domain was the subject of City of Duluth v. Minne-
sota,5 which arose out of the City of Duluth's (City) attempts
to revitalize a deteriorated area of land in West Duluth.52 The
City decided to establish a paper mill on the site and obtained
EZ status to attract investors.53 The City secured an interested
company which subsequently completed a feasibility study.'
Included in the feasibility study was a determination that a va-
cant food processing plant owned by Jeno Paulucci (Paulucci)55
would have to be demolished.56 Paulucci notified the City's
mayor that he planned to reopen the plant and proposed that
the site could accommodate both the plant and the paper
mill.5" The City determined that the two industries could not
coexist and moved to condemn Paulucci's property.58 Paulucci
subsequently challenged the condemnation proceedings.
The main thrust of Paulucci's argument was that since pri-
vate companies would be operating the paper mill, the taking of
his property was not for a "public use," and hence, violated
both the United States and Minnesota constitutions.5 9 In re-
viewing the City's actions, the court noted that the words "pub-
lic use" are used interchangeably with the words "public pur-
pose," which "thus impl[ies] that even though a public entity,
using its eminent domain powers, turns over parcels to a pri-
vate entity for use by that private entity, the condemnation
will, nevertheless, be constitutional if a public purpose is fur-
thered by such a transfer of land." °
50. Id. at 742-43.
51. 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986).
52. Id. at 760.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 760-61.
55. For snack food aficionados, Paulucci is the purveyor of "Jeno's Pizza Rolls."
Larry Oakes, In Duluth, He's the Stuff of Legends; Colorful Past Has Won Paulucci
Friends and Foes, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRB., Nov. 19, 1995, at l1A_
56. 390 N.W.2d at 761.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 761-62.
59. Id. at 762.
60. Id. at 763. In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), the United States Su-
preme Court expanded the notion of public use to include projects that incidentally
benefit private parties. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
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The court then proceeded to determine whether the condem-
nation of Paulucci's land constituted a public purpose. The court
took notice of the fact that the paper mill would create both
permanent and temporary employment in an economically de-
pressed area and rejuvenate an otherwise undevelopable area of
the city."' The court concluded that "[tihe revitalization of de-
teriorating urban areas and the alleviation of unemployment
are certainly public goals" 62 and affirmed the constitutionality
of the City's condemnation of Paulucci's land.63
C. Equal Protection Concerns
Zajicek v. Aaby" involved a disgruntled property owner,
Zajicek, who challenged the constitutionality of EZ legislation in
the City of Freeport, Illinois (City)." Zajicek owned a mobile
home park, which he expanded between 1990 and 1992; he had
plans to expand it further between 1993 and 1995.6" Under
Freeport's EZ system, retailers and property owners may re-
ceive tax benefits for activities related to the construction or
rehabilitation of improvements upon parcels of land located
within EZs. 7 Nevertheless, to qualify for the tax benefits, such
construction or rehabilitation must be "of the nature and scope
for which a building permit is required and has been ob-
tained."68 Zajicek applied numerous times for a building permit
for both his existing and planned construction, but he was
455 (Mich. 1981) (allowing the condemnation of land for transfer to private corpora-
tion).
61. 390 N.W.2d at 763.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 764. Although the court upheld the condemnation, it stated that "[the
argument] that the legislature and the courts have become far too lenient in allowing
governmental units to exercise eminent domain in urban renewal projects, particularly
where private property is condemned and then turned over to a new private ven-
ture... may have some merit." Id. at 767. Despite the problems that can and do
arise in intertwining governmental and business interests, public-private partnerships
may be the only way to effectively implement EZ policies in this era of dwindling
funds and bureaucratic simplification. Wolf, supra note 8, at 88. See Wolf, supra note
11, at 70-72 (discussing the future of public-private partnerships).
64. No. 94 C 50066, 1995 WL 150031 (N.D. Mll. Apr. 3, 1995), affd No. 95-2130,
1996 WL 47454 (7th Cir. Feb. 2 1996).
65. Id. at *1.
66. Id. at *2.
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id.
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repeatedly refused.69 Zajicek then brought suit, claiming that
his mobile home park was similarly situated with other residen-
tial developments, such as condominiums, apartment buildings
and subdivisions, and that the City's EZ system violated his
equal protection rights."
At trial, the court determined that since Zajicek's claim im-
plicated neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, the EZ
system would be subject to rational basis scrutiny.7 The court
stated that
[i]t is hard to conceive of a more rational basis for the City
to differentiate between properties, or property owners, than
on the basis of economic development consequences. It is
well within the bounds of equal protection law to provide
tax benefits to certain property owners in an effort to ap-
prove the conditions of the property ... "
Having found that the City's EZ legislation was constitutional,
the court dismissed Zajicek's case.73
Gay, City of Duluth, and Zajicek all echo a familiar theme in
judicial review of EZ legislation: Economic redevelopment and
urban renewal is a legitimate public purpose. While there is no
indication that the courts are moving away from this view, the
means used to accomplish these goals may come under closer
scrutiny, in terms of conferring direct benefits upon private
business concerns.74
III. QUALIFYING FOR EZ BENEFITS
A. Eligibility for EZ Benefits
A frequent point of contention is determining which business-
es are eligible to receive EZ benefits. In Beer v. Continental
Airlines (In re Continental Airlines),75 the city and county of
69. Id. at *2.
70. Id. at *4.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 63.
75. 149 B.R. 76 (D. Del. 1993).
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Denver sought to collect unpaid use taxes in the bankruptcy
proceedings of Continental Airlines (Continental). Continental
claimed that it was eligible for EZ tax credits based on Denver
Ordinance No. 75, Series of 1991,
which exempted sales of personalty from certain Denver
sales and use taxes so long as the personalty was 'to be
used, consumed, stored or distributed at a facility... (b)
that contains at least one million square feet of useable
floor space and (c) that serves as a ... regular place of
reporting for duty for at least two thousand employees. 6
At the bankruptcy court level, the court found in favor of
Continental, ruling that Continental met all of the require-
ments of Ordinance No. 75, thus qualifying for various tax
exemptions." Specifically, the bankruptcy court found that the
term "facility" as used in Ordinance No. 75 encompassed multi-
ple buildings, so long as they were used for a common pur-
pose."8 In Continental's case, the buildings were all used for
aviation purposes.79 The bankruptcy court further found that
Continental's "facility" met the one-million-square-feet-of-usable-
floor-space requirement, concluding that the amount of space
leased by Continental should have been included in calculating
usable floor space."0
On appeal, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court's
order. Finding that the term "facility" was ambiguous as used
in Ordinance No. 75, the district court turned to the legislative
history of the ordinance.8 The court determined that Ordi-
nance No. 75 was specifically "enacted to address [a] single
structure contemplated by [a] proposed United Airlines Mainte-
nance Facility, not the aggregation of multiple buildings of
existing utilities."82
76. Id. at 79. The court's finding is quite curious in light of the fact that the
Denver EZ was found not to be "special legislation" benefiting only one business in In
re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Roy Romer on House Bill 91S-1005, 814
P.2d 875 (Colo. 1991). See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
77. 149 B.R. at 79.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 87.
82. Id. at 88.
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The district court further found that although Continental
was obligated under leases for one million square feet of space,
Continental sublet a substantial portion of that space to other
businesses.83 The court thus concluded that (1) Continental
was no longer responsible for the sublet space; (2) there was no
potential for sales of personalty that would qualify for the tax
exemption for such space; and (3) no Continental employees
could report for duty to the sublet space.' The square footage
sublet by Continental, therefore, had to be deducted from the
calculation of floor space for purposes of Ordinance No. 75, and
as a result, Continental fell below the one-million-square-foot-
age requirement.85 Since Continental's operation did not fit the
definition of "facility," and failed to meet the square-footage
requirement of Ordinance No. 75, Continental could not qualify
for the EZ tax exemptions.86
Dav-Con, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners exempli-
fied the fact that EZ benefits do not accrue to businesses that
are, without more, merely situated within an EZ."7 Plaintiff
Dav-Con was a corporation that processed steel for its custom-
ers and stored the steel in the event that the steel was not
picked up immediately after processing." In 1992, Day-Con
filed an assessment for tangible personal property and applied
for an EZ inventory credit. 9 A field auditor for the State
Board subsequently assessed Dav-Con's property and deter-
mined that Dav-Con failed to report certain steel that had been
stored for its customers. ° The State Board then held a hear-
ing on Dav-Con's assessment, held it liable for the unreported
steel, and denied its request for EZ benefits. 1 Dav-Con subse-
quently appealed the State Board's decision.92
83. Id.
84. Id. at 89.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 90. The Colorado EZ system has come under fire as of late, as critics
accuse the state of using tax money to subsidize large businesses with few benefits
actually accruing to economically depressed areas. See Imse, supra note 10.
87. 644 N.E.2d 192 (Ind. T.C. 1994).
88. Id. at 193.
89. Id. at 194.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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On appeal, Dav-Con argued that it was entitled to an EZ tax
credit by virtue of the undisputed fact that it was located with-
in an EZ.93 Dav-Con, however, never filed the requisite forms
mandated by Indiana law to qualify for the EZ benefits.94 Dav-
Con further asserted that the accountants who prepared its tax
forms were "ignorant" of the filing requirement." The court
found that merely being located within an EZ does not auto-
matically qualify a business for an EZ credit and that ignorance
of filing requirement did not excuse Day-Con's failure to file.9"
The court accordingly affirmed the State Board's determination
concerning Dav-Con's ineligibility for EZ benefits.97
Schudy v. Cooper involved a dispute over the eligibility of
leased property for EZ benefits.98 Plaintiff Schudy acquired
property in the Cabool EZ, constructed a commercial building
on the site, and leased the property to Contel Telephone Com-
pany (Contel) 9 Schudy sought an ad valorem tax exemption
for the property, claiming that leasing the property was a "reve-
nue producing enterprise" eligible for EZ tax benefits. 00 The
Texas County Board of Equalization (Board) denied Schudy the
exemption.' 1 Schudy challenged the Board's decision in the
circuit court, which denied relief, and Schudy appealed.' 2
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court summarily dismissed
Schudy's complaint. 03 The court held that leasing improved
real property to a commercial tenant was not an activity
deemed a "revenue producing enterprise" according to the appi-'
cable statutes.'" Furthermore, Schudy's lease to Contel did
not constitute "the rendering of a service," which would have
entitled Schudy to the EZ tax exemption since service requires
93. Id. at 197.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 198.
98. 824 S.W.2d 899 (Mo. 1992).
99. Id. at 900.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 901.
104. Id. at 900-01.
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an act or deed and "does not include the passive activity of
leasing improved real estate.""5
Beer, Day-Con, and Schudy illustrate the principle that tax
exemptions will be strictly construed against the taxpayer, and
the courts' unwillingness to loosely interpret EZ legislation to
cover marginally qualifying businesses.
B. Sale of Existing Qualified Businesses
Columbia Sun, Inc. v. Department of Revenue involved a
disgruntled purchaser of property that lost its EZ eligibility as
a result of the property's sale.0 6 Columbia Sun, Inc. (Colum-
bia) owned a food processing plant and had obtained a partial
property tax exemption pursuant to Oregon's EZ system in
1988.107 In 1993, Columbia sold the plant to Universal Frozen
Foods Company (Universal).0 8 Not long thereafter, Columbia
and its owners, John and Judy Betz (Betz), were notified that
the sale to Universal disqualified the property from the EZ tax
exemption and that the previously exempted taxes would be
recaptured by adding the exempted amount to the tax levied in
the 1993-94 tax year.0 9 As required by the sales contract be-
tween Columbia and Universal, Betz reimbursed Universal for
the recaptured taxes."0 Columbia and Betz appealed to the
Department of Revenue (Department), but were unsuccessful,
and subsequently appealed to the Oregon Tax Court."'
The Tax Court simply found that as mandated by Oregon EZ
legislation, property that is granted EZ tax exemptions becomes
disqualified upon its sale, and the previously exempted tax is
subject to recapture." The court held, therefore, that the sale
of Columbia's property to Universal disqualified that property
and subjected Universal to liability for the previously exempted
105. Id. at 901.
106. 900 P.2d 1039 (Or. 1995).
107. Id. at 1039-40.
108. Id. at 1040.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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tax." Columbia and Betz then appealed to the Oregon Su-
preme Court."
The supreme court never reached the merits of the case,
finding that Columbia and Betz lacked standing to sue."5 The
court determined that, according to Oregon law, only "two types
of taxpayers [may] appeal to the Tax Court: (1) a taxpayer
aggrieved by and directly affected by an order of the Depart-
ment [of Revenue], and (2) a taxpayer whose property is affect-
ed by an order of the Department.... " According to the
court, neither Columbia nor Betz had standing under the sec-
ond classification above since neither had an interest in the
property at issue when the Department made its determina-
tion." In addition, neither Columbia nor Betz were taxpayers
"aggrieved by and directly affected by an order of the Depart-
ment," since they were only liable as a result of the terms of
the contract between Columbia and Universal."' The contract
"'was an intervening instrumentality or determining influence'
which rendered the Department's order indirect.""' The court,
therefore, vacated the Tax Court's ruling and remanded with
instructions to dismiss.'
Keeter Mfg., Inc. v. Department of Revenue also involved dis-
qualification for EZ benefits by virtue of the sale of exempted
property." In 1989, Keeter Manufacturing, Inc. (Old Keeter)
applied for and received an EZ property tax exemption." In
1990, Old Keeter sold its assets to Pentadyne Technologies, Inc.
(New Keeter).' After learning of the sale, the county assessor
disqualified the property from tax exemption.' After a par-
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1041.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 13 Or. Tax 124 (1994).
122. Id. at 125.
123. Id. Old Keeter eventually changed its name to Keeter, Inc., and Pentadyne
assumed the name Keeter Manufacturing, Inc. Id. at 126.
124. Id. at 126.
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tially unsuccessful appeal to the Department of Revenue, New
Keeter appealed to the Tax Court.'
The Tax Court stated that according to Oregon's EZ legisla-
tion, "[a]n eligible business firm becomes a qualified firm only
with respect to specific property" and that only new property
can be qualified." Therefore, "[b]ecause only new property
can be qualified, it is impossible for property, once exempted
within the zone, to be sold to another firm and be qualified
property, nor can the purchasing firm be a qualified firm as to
that property." "7 As a result of Old Keeter's sale of its prop-
erty to New Keeter, the court ruled that New Keeter could not
claim eligibility for its newly acquired property.'
C.W.O., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue involved a dispute
over whether the sale of an existing business to a corporation
within an enterprise zone merely resulted in the transfer of
jobs, disqualifying the corporation for EZ benefits. 9 C. W.
Olsen. Inc. (Olsen), located in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Gar-
field, Minnesota, was a manufacturing firm whose financial
condition began to deteriorate in 1984."0 By 1985, Olsen was
facing bankruptcy and liquidation."' A new corporation,
C.W.O, Inc. (CWO), was formed by stockholders from Montevi-
deo, Minnesota and agreed to purchase Olsen's assets."'
Olsen subsequently closed its operations in Minneapolis and
Garfield, terminated its employees, and finalized its sale to
CWO.
133
After CWO purchased Olsen's assets, CWO applied to the
Montevideo City Council for EZ tax credits." The City Coun-
cil approved, finding that "[e]nterprise zone tax credits by
C.W.O., Inc., will not have the effect of transferring existing
employment from one or more municipalities within the
125. Id.
126. Id. at 128.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 130.
129. No. 4501, 1986 WL 9364 (Minn. T.C. Oct. 28, 1986).
130. Id. at *2.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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state."'35 The Commissioner of Revenue (Commissioner), how-
ever, disapproved CWO's application, finding that the CWO
project involved a transfer of employment, and therefore did not
qualify for EZ benefits."6 CWO subsequently appealed the
Commissioner's ruling.3 '
On appeal, the Minnesota Tax Court placed heavy emphasis
on the fact that Olsen was going out of business. Concluding
that the jobs in Minneapolis and Garfield would have been lost
regardless of Olsen's sale to CWO, the court ruled that the
Commissioner should have approved CWO's application for EZ
tax credits.'38
Columbia Sun, Keeter, and C.W.O. again exemplify the
judiciary's close reading of applicable EZ statutes. Two of the
fundamental principles of EZs are new business and new job
creation, and courts are not likely to allow existing businesses
to take advantage of EZ benefits targeted for such new commer-
cial ventures.
C. Exemptions for the Sale and Use of Goods Within EZs
In Craftmasters, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, plaintiff
Craftmasters, a contracting firm, sought a refund of retailer's
occupation taxes pursuant to Illinois EZ legislation. 9
Craftmasters purchased building materials from a business
outside a designated EZ and then incorporated those materials
into customers' real estate that was located within a Decatur,
Illinois EZ.' After auditing Craftmasters, the Department of
Revenue (Department) issued a notice of tax liability to
Craftmasters for the materials purchased from suppliers outside
the Decatur EZ.'
Craftmasters challenged the Department's assessment and
sought a refund for the assessed taxes.' The Department ar-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 647 N.E.2d 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
140. Id. at 608.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 608-09.
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gued that according to its interpretation of the EZ legislation,
the occupation tax exemption applied only where a contractor's
purchases were made from a supplier within the Decatur EZ
but was inapplicable where the supplier was located outside the
EZ.' At the trial level, the court did not accept the
Department's interpretation of the statute and found for
Craftmasters.'" The Department subsequently appealed.
On appeal, the court first determined that Craftmaster's
incorporation of the building materials into real estate was a
use of the materials and hence did not constitute a retail
sale.' Therefore, the retail sale at issue was Craftmaster's
purchase of the building materials, not the incorporation of the
materials into the customer's real estate.' The court conclud-
ed that "it is not an arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation of
the enterprise zone exemption to require the purchases, direct
or indirect, to be made from a supplier located within the juris-
diction which created the enterprise zone to qualify for the
exemption," and reversed the trial court. 47
Another case involving the sale and use of personal property
in an EZ is Fedway Assoc. v. Director, Division of Taxation."
Fedway was a wholesale distributor of wines and alcoholic
beverages.'49 It was issued an Urban Enterprise Exempt Pur-
chase Permit (Permit) for its corporate office and warehouse
complex, the latter of which served as a distribution center for
four subsidiary organizations. 50 The Permit exempted Fedway
from use tax on purchases of tangible personal property, pro-
vided that such property was consumed solely and exclusively
by Fedway within the EZ. 5'
143. Id. at 609.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 610.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 611. There is currently before Congress legislation requiring that a
certain portion of federal purchases be made from businesses located within EZs. S.
17, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1297, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see EZ
GAZETrE, supra note 8.
148. 14 N.J. Tax 71 (1994), affd per curiam, 659 A.2d 536 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995).
149. 14 N.J. Tax at 73.
150. Id. at 74.
151. Id.
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As part of its sales strategy, Fedway purchased certain goods
which were distributed at its central complex to its sales staff
as compensation or marketing aids.'52 The salespersons could
either keep the items or give them to their customers.'53 The
Director claimed that the items in question were taxable and
demanded payment." Fedway sued, however, contending that
the goods were exempt, since they were consumed in the EZ
when the sales staff picked them up."
In ruling upon Fedway's tax liability, the New Jersey Tax
Court determined that personal property which is to be exempt
under the Permit must be
consumed, that is, used up in the enterprise zone with no
remaining residual utility. Purchases of property and sub-
sequent transfers of title to others by the qualified business,
for further use or consumption outside the enterprise zone,
do not meet the statutory requirement of exclusive use
within the zone, or consuming or using up the property
within the zone.'
The court went on to find that the property that Fedway
sought to exempt retained utility even after Fedway "used" it
and that the promotional items were neither distributed to
customers within the EZ, nor consumed within the EZ. 57 The
court thus concluded that the Permit exemptions applied to
none of the property claimed by Fedway.1
58
The eligibility for an EZ tax exemption of personal property
used in a motel was the subject of Edgewater Inn, Inc. v. De-
partment of Revenue."' Edgewater Inn, Inc. (Inn) purchased
and used certain personal property in its motel business and
tried to secure an EZ tax exemption for the property in
question. 6 ' Although the county assessor initially granted the
exemption, he later reversed his position and determined that
152. Id. at 75.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 78.
157. Id. at 79.
158. Id.
159. 13 Or. T.C. 117 (1994).
160. Id. at 117.
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the property at issue did not qualify.'6 ' The Inn eventually
appealed to the Oregon Tax Court.
The tax court, in a strikingly abbreviated opinion, began by
setting out the relevant provisions of Oregon law dealing with
EZ property tax exemptions. 6 ' According to the applicable
statutes, qualified property includes:
[1] any real property machinery or equipment.., installed
in property owned or leased by a qualified business firm, [2]
any single item of personal property machinery or equip-
ment. .. installed in property owned or leased by a quali-
fied business firm, and [3] any property otherwise described
in this section that is owned or leased and operated by
a .. .motel.163
The Inn claimed that the property in question was "equip-
ment" which was "installed in property owned or leased by a
qualified business firm" and hence was exempt.' The court
rejected this argument, however, claiming that the Inn "ig-
nore[d] the words 'real property'."'65 The tax court concluded
that the exemption was "only for machinery or equipment
which, due to its size or nature, becomes part of real property
and is assessed as such."'66 Since the property in question
apparently did not meet this description, the court disallowed
the exemption." 7
Craftmasters, Fedway, and Edgewater Inn again show that
tax exemptions are to be strictly construed against the taxpay-
er. Furthermore, Craftmasters and Fedway also are illustrative
of the fact that EZ legislation is usually designed to stimulate
EZ economies to the greatest extent possible. Sales and use tax
exemptions for consumer goods, therefore, provide the maximum
benefit when they apply only to goods bought within the bound-
aries of the EZ, and the courts appear to support this aspect of
the EZ system.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 118.
163. Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 285.607(2)(d),(e) & (g) (1983)).
164. Id. at 119.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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D. Local Government Consent
St. Landry Parish School Board v. Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co.
involved a dispute over sales and use taxes between a parish
school board and police jury and an owner of land in an indus-
trial area." In 1983, defendant Martco Partnership (Martco)
informed plaintiff St. Landry Police Jury that Martco would be
privately furnishing garbage and refuse collection within the
Parish of St. Landry.'69 Prior to commencing operations,
Martco applied to the State of Louisiana under Louisiana's
Enterprise Zone Act for exemption from sales and use, income,
and corporate franchise taxes." ° The School Board and Police
Jury subsequently executed a Certificate of Local Government
Endorsement endorsing Martco's participation in the EZ pro-
gram. 7 Martco then entered into a contract with the State of
Louisiana which provided EZ benefits for Martco's operations
within the EZ.Y2 Such contracts can only be entered into if
the governing body of the appropriate local government entity
endorses the exemptions sought. ' A number of years later,
the School Board and the Police Jury sued to recover the taxes
which would have been due had Martco not been exempt.'7
The trial court found for Martco, and the School Board ap-
pealed."7 5
On appeal, the School Board argued that the language in
both the School Board's and the Police Jury's endorsement of
Martco's tax exemptions was equivocal.'76 Since exemptions
from taxes are exceptional privileges, they must be clearly,
unequivocally and affirmatively established; thus, according to
the School Board, the endorsements had to fail. 77 In the al-
ternative, the School Board argued that it was without authori-
168. 606 So. 2d 933 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
169. Id at 934.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 937.
177. Id.
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ty to grant any exemption to Martco under Louisiana's Enter-
prise Zone Act. 7 '
The court summarily rejected both of the School Board's
arguments. 79 First, the court examined the language of both
endorsements. The School Board granted the exemption "pend-
ing proper legal advice to make sure the granting of the said
exemption [was] legal."18 The Police Jury also assented to the
tax exemption, but stated that if "[the endorsement] is illegal,
the approval will be withdrawn." 8' The court held that the
endorsements were not equivocal, but "simply stated the obvi-
ous, i.e., if the resolutions are invalid, they would be null and
would be disregarded. The reference to legal advice .. does
not make an action equivocal since this concern is implicit in
all governmental action."'82 Second, the court dismissed the
claim that the School Board was without authority to grant the
exemption, since "the actual exemption did not come from the
School Board, but from the State."'8
IV. TAx ISSUES
A. Applicability of EZ Tax Credits
Horizon Bancorp, N.A. v. Indiana Department of State Reve-
nue was a case involving EZ tax benefits accruing. from grant-
ing loans to EZ businesses."M Under Indiana EZ legislation,
interest received on a qualified loan entitles the taxpayer to a
credit against its state gross income tax liability for a taxable
year." Horizon Bancorp (Horizon), a financial institution lo-
cated in Indiana, earned a substantial number of EZ loan inter-
est credits between 1984 and 1989.188 During the same period
of*'time, Horizon's bank tax liability exceeded its gross income
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citations omitted).
183. Id.
184. 626 N.E.2d 603 (Ind. T.C. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
644 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. 1994).
185. 626 N.E.2d at 610-11.
186. Id. at 608.
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tax liability; Horizon's bank tax payments also were available
as credits against its gross income tax liability.'7 Horizon
then filed a claim for a refund, seeking $968,283 in excess bank
tax credits, but received only $503,887 plus $58,965 in inter-
est.'" The Department of State Revenue (Department) denied
the balance of the claim for refund, and Horizon appealed.'89
The amount of Horizon's refund hinged in part on the order
in which the tax credits were applied, since excess bank tax
credits were refundable, while excess loan credits were not.'
If the bank tax credits were applied to Horizon's gross income
tax liability first, any excess credits would be loan credits, thus
precluding Horizon from receiving a refund.m The Depart-
ment asserted that the bank tax credits had to be applied first,
thus justifying a lower refund for Horizon.'92
The court cited three reasons for rejecting the Department's
argument. First, the bank tax credit provisions were older than
the loan credit provisions, implying that the legislature was
aware of the former when enacting the latter, and there was
nothing in the loan credit provisions indicating that bank tax
credits were to negate loan credits.'93 The court further stated
that
[i]f banks like Horizon, which consistently offset all, or
almost all, of their gross income tax liability with bank tax
credits were unable to get any use from any loan credits
under [EZ legislation] the banks would have no incentive to
make qualifying loans and the loan credits would fail in
their purpose. The court will not presume the legislature
intended [such] an absurd result.14
Second, the statutes governing the computation of credits
dictate that bank tax credits be applied before certain other
credits." While the Department urged that these statutes
187. Id. at 604.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 611.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 612.
195. Id. at 611.
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mandated application of loan credits after bank tax credits, the
court held that proper application of the relevant legislation
"requires application of non-refundable credits like the loan
credits to be applied before refundable credits like the bank tax
credits."'96 Third, the court held that the statute creating the
loan credits and the statute governing the computation of cer-
tain credits have to be construed together.'97 The court stated,
"[i]f the legislature had intended IC 6-3.1-7-4 to create a hierar-
chy of application of loan credits and other credits, it would
have inserted language to that effect, as it did in IC 6-3.1-1-
2(a)." 98 Since the legislature did not take such course of ac-
tion, Horizon's loan credits were properly applied before the
bank tax credits.
In Missouri ex rel. May Department Stores v. Koupal, the
May Department Store Company (May) challenged the Missouri
Department of Revenue's (Department) interpretation of Mis-
souri EZ statutes concerning the applicability of May's EZ tax
credits.' May had opened two new department stores in
Joplin, Missouri, which had been designated an EZ.2" By es-
tablishing new business facilities within the EZ, May became
eligible for certain EZ tax credits.2"' To qualify for the credits,
May had to submit the matter to the Department for calcula-
tion and certification." 2 The Department limited May's EZ
credits to the amount of taxable income that was attributable
to the two new stores.0 3 May challenged the Department's in-
terpretation of the EZ statutes, claiming that the credits should
have been applied to May's entire Missouri taxable income.2"4
May brought suit, lost at trial, and appealed.
The Department on appeal offered three arguments in sup-
port of its interpretation of the statute creating the EZ tax
credits. All three failed. First, although this statute, Mo. Rev.
Stat. section 135.225(8) (1986), specifically stated that such
196. Id. at 612.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 835 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. 1992).
200. Id. at 319.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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credits "shall not be limited to some portion of the income
tax,"2"5 the Department argued that the statute in question
had to be read in conjunction with other EZ statutes that limit-
ed benefits to new business facility income. °6 The court reject-
ed the Department's argument, stating that if the legislature
had wanted to limit the EZ tax credits to new business income,
it could have easily inserted the language in the statute as it
had done elsewhere, or if the legislature had meant to rely
entirely on the other EZ provisions, there would have been no
need to enact section 135.225 in the first place.0'
The Department's second argument centered around the use
of the word "the" in the phrase "some portion of the income
tax."2"' The Department asserted that "the" implied reference
to "income tax" as a prior defined term, and since "income tax"
was limited to new business facility income in prior statutes, it
had to be limited to such income in later statutes.2 9 The
court determined that since the earlier statutes also included
the phrase "the income tax," the Department's interpretation
begged the question of the previous definition to which the
earlier statutes refer.21
Finally, the Department argued that tax exemptions should
be construed strictly against the taxpayer and that its interpre-
tation of the statute should be given great weight.21 The
court agreed, but again refused to accept the Department's
argument, holding that the plain and ordinary meaning of the
words dictate that the EZ credits apply to May's entire Missou-
ri taxable income.1
Horizon Bancorp and May mark a departure from construing
tax exemptions strictly against the taxpayer and perhaps sug-
gest that businesses, already qualified for EZ benefits, should
be permitted to take full advantage of such benefits.
205. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 135.225(8) (1986)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 320.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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B. Challenges to "Unequal" Tax
Blume v. County of Ramsey involved a challenge to a legisla-
tive scheme, called disparity reduction aid, that conferred tax
benefits on certain property owners within EZs.2 13 Disparity
reduction aid is a form of property tax relief which is based
upon the total tax burden within "unique taxing jurisdictions"
(UTJ's), legislatively created districts that are subject to the
same set of tax capacity rates.214 The effect of the disparity
reduction aid plan is that different parcels of land of equal
value, in the same class based on type and usage and in the
same local taxing district, are assessed differently for tax pur-
poses.21
Gary P. Blume, plaintiff, owned property that was not eligi-
ble for disparity reduction aid.21  Blume sued Minnesota,
claiming that the legislative scheme violated both his federal
equal protection rights and the uniformity clause of the Minne-
sota Constitution, which requires that "taxes [be] uniform upon
the same class of subjects." 17 The court utilized traditional
rational basis analysis for both challenges to determine whether
Minnesota's classification of Blume's property bore a rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose."'
In analyzing the validity of the disparity reduction aid sys-
tem, the court first found that a reasonable distinction existed
between Blume's property and the tracts that qualified for the
tax benefits, since the qualifying tracts were more heavily bur-
dened by various property taxes.2 1 9 The court then found that
the classification scheme in question furthered legitimate gov-
ernment purposesY.0 Disparity reduction aid targeted tax re-
lief to areas where such relief would most likely equalize tax
burdens, and would "foster economic recovery in depressed
areas of the state and/or declining central cities .... Attempts
213. No. C9-88-2861, 1989 WL 28940 (Minn. T.C. Mar. 31, 1989).
214. Id. at *7.
215. Id. at *8.
216. Id. at *1.
217. Id. at *8 (quoting MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1).
218. 1989 WL 28940 at *8.
219. Id. at *9-*11.
220. Id. at *11.
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to remedy these perceived problems are legitimate public policy,
and reducing disparities is a rational way of addressing such
problems.""' The court thus affirmed the legitimacy of the
disparity reduction aid scheme.
Blume, and the cases that follow, again illustrate the wide-
spread acceptance of economic redevelopment as legitimate
public policy.
V. EZ LEGISLATION AS EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC POLICY
Apart from ruling on challenges to, or the interpretation of,
EZ statutes, courts have also cited EZ legislation as evidence of
the existence of certain public policies.
Department of Revenue v. ACF Industries, Inc. involved a
challenge by a railroad company to tax exemptions given for
non-railroad business property.2" In upholding the Oregon
Department of Revenue's tax scheme, the Supreme Court cited
EZs for the proposition that "it is standard practice for States
to grant exemptions to commercial entities for ... beneficial
purposes."'
In Davidson Bros. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc.,2" Davidson,
which operated a number of supermarkets, closed one of its
grocery stores in New Brunswick, an economically depressed
area, and sold the store to Katz." The deed to Katz con-
tained a restrictive covenant prohibiting the use of the property
as a supermarket.226 In striking down the covenant as being
unreasonable, the court cited New Jersey's EZ legislation as
evidence of how "urban rehabilitation is imbedded in public
policy and the public interest."22
Bosworth v. Pledger involved a challenge to a sales tax stat-
ute that taxed regular long distance telephone service, but not
"wide area telecommunications service" typically used by busi-
221. Id.
222. 114 S.Ct. 843 (1994).
223. Id. at 852.
224. 643 A.2d 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
225. Id. at 643.
226. Id.
227. Id at 648.
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nesses.228 In upholding the validity of the sales tax, the court
cited Arkansas's EZ legislation for the proposition that Arkan-
sas has a long history of providing tax incentives as a means of
encouraging the establishment of business within the state.2"
Finally, in People v. Mitchell,"0 a criminal case, the court,
in an appendix to its decision, listed Illinois's EZ legislation
among state statutes that specifically prohibited gender discrim-
ination.2"'
VI. CONCLUSION
As the federal EZ program continues to develop, the legal
issues arising out of continuing legislative attempts at urban
renewal will inevitably multiply. The efficacy and soundness of
the federal effort will be subject to judgment only after the
passage of time. Nevertheless, the EZ projects conducted in the
"laboratory of the states," as surveyed in this article, may pro-
vide valuable guidance in determining the resolution of legal
difficulties that accompany EZs and may help avert the errors
which, as the Colorado experience demonstrates, can all too
easily be made.
Patrick J. Skelley 11
228. 810 S.W.2d 918 (Ark. 1991).
229. Id. at 923.
230. 593 N.E.2d 882 (IlM. App. Ct. 1992).
231. Id. at 934.
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